Kurds worried as Saddam’s legacy lingers in Iraq

Muqtada-al-Sadr casts his vote in Najaf at the May 12 elections. Photo: Reuters

Iraq’s May 12 national parliamentary elections saw the State of Law Coalition lose its status as the ruling party in government, with Saairun taking the reigns as Iraq’s premier political force.

The U.S begrudgingly deemed the surprise result to be “credible“, an outcome which would see their preferred  Prime Minister, Nouri-al-Maliki, lose his grip on power after nearly 12 years.

However, it was the Kurdish people living in Northern Iraq and the borders of Syria, Iran and Turkey who were the most concerned with the result, as it could signal to a return to the Saddam era.

It seems that Sarriun, which is led by Muqtada al-Sadr who is a Shia cleric, and includes communist parties in its alliance, could not be further away from Saddam Hussein’s totalitarian regime.

But remove the veneer of this drastic shift in Iraq’s parliamentary composition and the same economic problems and ethnic and religious divisions that have plagued the country since colonialism still persist.

Iraq’s colonial era officially ended in granted independence by Britain in 1932, but the borders of state were drawn up to suit strategic and economic interests of Britain and its allies in the area, with disregard for tribe-based systems that had been present for centuries.

These tensions came to a boiling point with the 1970 Iraqi–Kurdish War, after which the Kurds were granted greater autonomy via Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Kurds became increasingly more independent from Iraq culturally, and also economically as many U.S oil and finance companies set up their headquarters in the region.

When Saddam rose to power in 1979, this Kurdish autonomy was against his totalitarian ideology of state supremacy and nationalism, so he sought to violently oppress the ethnic group.

This included gassing entire Kurdish villages and towns.

After Saddam was toppled,  the U.S wanted to bridge the gap between broader Iraq and the Kurdish by aiding election campaigns of Kurdish politicians in Iraq.

But resentment against the U.S and their Kurdish allies has risen among many Iraqis, as while the Kurds may have benefited from this alliance,  from a human development perspective Iraq has largely stagnated since the “democratic revolution“.

For example, literacy among young Iraqis has decreased 3 per cent since the turn of the century.

In addition, there has been a rapid rise in “Saddam nostalgia” across the country, with his hard line approach to violent extremism becoming appealing in a country still licking its wounds from an ISIS wave of terror.

Although al-Sadr is a cleric, he has proposed a similar secular vision to Saddam’s, with a return to ultra-nationalism and a rejection of any U.S intervention in national affairs.

The Kurds will be collectively hoping this vision goes the way of Saddam.

Lebanon’s waste crisis exposes the stench of toxic sectarianism and corruption

Piled up garbage is seen in Jiyeh, 20 kilometres south of Beirut. Photo: Reuters

In July 2015, tens of thousands across Lebanon took to the streets to protest.

Unlike many of their Middle Eastern counterparts who had seen demonstrations of that scale since the turn of the decade, they seemingly weren’t demanding grand political or economic concessions from their government.

They were simply demanding a solution to the local issue of waste overflow within the Naameh rubbish tip, located on the southern outskirts of Beirut.

The government promptly caved into pressure and shut the landfill site down, but as of May 2018, the government has not found a long-term alternative site or method to dispose of Beirut’s waste.

Beirut’s local rubbish situation is just a flashpoint that highlights a national political system plagued by religious sectarianism and corruption.

Lebanon’s religious diversity is heavily intertwined with its political system, as 18 recognised religious sects are represented in parliament.

Following the signing of the civil-war ending Taif Agreement in 1989, Lebanon’s confessional system was reinforced as it re-distributed power away from Maronite Christians to a growing Islamic population.

For example, the roles of president and the speaker of parliament, which by law have to be represented by a Sunni Muslim and a Shia Muslim, were granted greater executive powers.

But altering the colonial-influenced political landscape and system almost overnight inevitably led to a power vacuum.

In order to cement their precarious position in a competitive political climate, a climate that was also rife with both Christian and Islamic-based violent extremism, political leaders maintained their grip on power by establishing neo-patrimonial ties that were grounded in their religious affiliation, as these ties would remain stable due to the pronounced religious divisions in the country.

But corruption ensued as state resources were drained in order to satisfy these loyalists, which inevitability led to the government’s effectiveness and economic position deteriorating.

As a consequence, its ability to carry out essential services, like waste disposal, also deteriorated.

Therein lies the problem.

Transparency International rates Lebanon as the 143^rd most corrupt country in the world out of 180 surveyed.

But despite the widespread corruption, Lebanon is the second most democratic country in the Middle East, according to the Economist’s Democracy Index.

A growing number of political scientists believe that the same neo-patrimonial relations that cultivated rampant, systemic corruption have simultaneously stabilised a vulnerable and religiously divided state, by establishing reliable financial and security networks that are grounded in rigid religious ties.

This in turn has enabled the Lebanese government to keep violent extremism from completely eroding the country’s democratic institutions.

As a result, Lebanese voters are anxious about how they might disturb this delicate balance and empower terrorist groups lurking on the periphery of Lebanon’s political sphere, like Al-Nusra, if they alter their voting patterns.

This was evident in the recent May 6 national elections, with Hezbollah, who is largely responsible for Lebanon’s primary militia against terrorism, making significant gains.

Furthermore, Saad Hariri’s Future Movement still wields the balance of power in Lebanon’s unity government, despite their major role in the widescale political corruption, including the Naameh waste saga.

 

 

Where did it all go wrong for Egypt?

A protester at Tahir Square on February 10, 2011. Photo: Politico

As the Arab Spring wave swept onto Tahir Square in early 2011, Jack Shenker from The Guardian, like many others across the globe, shared a new sense of optimism that Egypt’s invigorated youth would lead a peaceful transition towards a democratic future for Africa’s third most populous country.

Just under five years later, Adam Roberts from The Guardian, like many others across the globe, pondered one simple question.

Where did it all go wrong?

A quantitative analysis of Egypt’s situation in the post-Mubarak era overwhelmingly points to a lack of funds as the primary reason behind the country’s inability to sustain a democratic system.

There is a general consensus that soaring double-digit unemployment, high income inequality and rising stagflation were among the crucial issues that sparked the initial revolution.

However, in the two years following the ousting of Mubarak, the economic situation in Egypt deteriorated further, with GDP growth plummeting to its lowest point in over 20 years.

While it is true that the economy is typically worse off immediately after political upheaval, as occurred after the Egyptian revolution of 1952, historically it would rebound within two or three years when the next boom phase of the economic cycle would kick in.

Conversely, this did not happen after the 2011 revolution, and Egypt’s economic dependence on the West could be largely to blame.

The vast majority of the $13 billion of foreign investment allocated towards key infrastructure projects in Egypt virtually disappeared overnight, as foreign investors are far more adverse to any signs of political volatility, in comparison to domestic investors.

To make matters worse, sentiment in the West turned against the Muslim Brotherhood, with many conservatives in United States claiming the party had strong links to Islamic terrorist organisations.

In response, Morsi’s supporters accused his opponents of colluding with the U.S to undermine the democratically elected government, which reignited long-standing sectarian tensions in Egypt that further fueled the volatile political climate.

This left Egypt in a catch-22 scenario, where they needed an injection of capital to fix their increasingly desperate situation, but no foreign investor would hand over the funds because of their situation.

To make matters even worse, many independent domestic companies and institutions had largely been replaced by overseas capital from multinational corporations over the years, so they could not fill the gaping economic void.

The lack of growth led to a rapid swell of disenchantment towards elected President Mohammed Morsi.

The turning tide against Morsi and fragile democratic institutions in conjunction with a financially crippled public sector, enabled Chief General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to seize power and re-establish an authoritarian regime.

Where Egypt will be in another five years is hotly debated, but from the evidence there is one thing that is clear.

If the optimism of a peaceful, democratic future is to return, a stable, prosperous economic climate must exist first.